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Introduction
Discussion of the New Zealand experience 
with the public sector reforms of the 1980s 
and 1990s has emphasised fragmentation 
of the structure of the state under so-called 
new public management. The first sentence 
of a leading standard textbook, Government 
Administration (Polaschek), reads as follows: 
 In New Zealand – a country of  a few million – the 
work of  government administration is shared by forty 
one departments of  state and almost one thousand 
local authorities, government sponsored companies 
and public or semi-public corporations.
The only surprising thing about this quotation is that it 
dates from 1958, when New Zealand’s population was two 
and a half  million.ii In 2007, with a population of  over four 
million, the work of  government administration was shared 
by fewer than 350 organisations (excluding schools and 
subsidiaries), around 25% of  the 1958 total.iii 
This article will try to sort out myths from realities by 
exploring three broad questions:
• Has the state in fact become more fragmented?
• What is the evidence about the effect of  structure on 
performance?
• What do the likely future trends imply for the structure of  
the state?
Fragmentation of the state?
New Zealand has a long history of  creating single-purpose 
ad hoc bodies, and often these have been very small. This 
predates the new public management reforms of  the 1980s 
and 1990s and indeed continues into the early 21st century. 
So has the state become more fragmented?
The short answer is that, other than for the most 
recent period, we don’t know. The longer answer is that 
we don’t know because in order to answer the question, 
‘fragmentation’ needs to be clearly defined and consistent 
data should be used to delineate what constitutes the state. 
Fragmentation is relatively easy to measure: it refers to the 
number of  separate administrative units in the government 
system, and that includes vertical structure (the number of  
tiers) and horizontal structure (the number of  organisational 
units within a tier).iv 
The harder part is that there is no consistent historical 
definition of  what constitutes a public body that is part of  
the state. The notion that Fonterra is part of  the state would 
be greeted with derision and incredulity in 2008. The view 
that the same legal body (the Dairy Board) was part of  the 
state would have been a statement of  the obvious in 1936. 
The introduction of  accrual accounting, which required the 
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creation of  the Consolidated Crown Financial Reporting 
Entity, provided a consistent basis for defining central 
government. Since 1991 consolidated government accrual 
accounts have been available, but no historical time series 
exists prior to that.
History does enable us to draw some conclusions 
about trends in the state sector (and hence the degree of  
fragmentation). In summary, the long-term trends in the 
structure of  the New Zealand state include:
• ‘[a] large number of  small departments and a small 
number of  large departments’ (Schick, 1996, p.28), so 
the overall number of  departments is consistently high by 
international standards (40-50);
• a propensity to create ad hoc arms-length organisations 
(in 1984, 25% of  state sector employees worked in 
departments; by 2007 the proportion had fallen to 20%);
• a propensity for restructuring: of  41 departments in 1957, 
only 21 existed in 1995 (often with changed functions and 
names).
Within these longer-term trends there were some 
significant changes:
• growth in the number of  ministerial portfolios, from 
around 20 in 1912 to 58 in 2007 (together with 14 other 
responsibilities and 37 associates);
• consolidation in local government, from 850 mainly 
single-purpose authorities in 1989 to 74 territorial local 
authorities and 12 regional councils;
• shedding of  commercial functions from departments in 
the 1980s (via the creation of  state-owned enterprises and 
privatisation) and 1990s (e.g. the Public Trust, Valuation 
New Zealand and Learning Media).
New Zealand’s administrative history can be broken up 
into three phases:v 1912 to mid-1984, the period from the 
introduction of  the initial public service reforms through 
until the 1984 election; mid-1984 to late 1999, which was 
the period of  extensive public sector reform; and late 1999 
to today. 
Phase one: 1912–1984 – governance by hierarchies
Throughout the period until mid-1984 the state played an 
active role in the economy, providing commercial services 
often through trading departments or local government 
enterprises.
Local government was a creature of  central government, 
consisting of  a plethora of  single-purpose organisations with 
a prescribed and narrow mandate. The role was limited to 
a defined set of  local service functions (‘roads, rubbish and 
rats’) and some commercial activities (e.g. port services), 
with central government undertaking a number of  functions 
which in comparable jurisdictions would be in the domain 
of  local government. These include providing fire services, 
policing, public schooling and public hospital services. 
Central government consisted of  a Cabinet of  up to 
20 ministers and a greater number of  portfolios, served 
by 35-45 departments of  state and a plethora of  non-
departmental public organisations. Over time the relative 
share of  central government employment accounted for by 
ministerial departments shrank from 39% in 1949 to 35% 
by 1971, and 25% by 1984.vi Despite a royal commission 
on the state sector in the early 1960s, no consistent design 
principles or meta-design were employed. There were 
repeated unsuccessful attempts to improve the performance 
of  individual commercial functions (such as the railways) by 
moving them into a corporate form. In Julian Le Grand’s 
terminology, this was a state where providers were viewed 
as ‘knights’ and consumers as ‘pawns’. In summary, the 
structure of  the state ‘morphed’, or in the words of  the title 
of  this paper it emerged ‘more by accident than design’.
Phase two: 1984–1999 – governance by markets  
and contracts
The period after the 1984 election was an era of  significant 
change in both central and local government. In central 
government the initial changes were concentrated in the 
commercial departments but subsequently extended to the 
entire public sector, with:
• the separation of  commercial and non-commercial 
functions and the break-up of  trading departments;
• the creation of  state-owned enterprises (SOEs);
• the creation of  the concept of  Crown entities;
• the Cabinet increasing in size and the number of  
departments remaining broadly stable but the number of  
Crown entities growing significantly.vii 
The central government reorganisation and restructuring 
was based on a set of  machinery-of-government 
principles:viii 
• separation of  ownership and purchase;
• separation of  policy from operations; 
• separation of  policy from purchase and provision; 
• the introduction of  competition; and 
• reallocation of  function for focus, synergy and 
transparency. 
One can argue about the consistency with which these 
were applied, but there was no doubting the existence of  a 
comprehensive design over this period.
It was also an era of  significant local government reform, 
with the consolidation of  single-purpose organisations into 
multi-purpose bodies to serve defined areas. This resulted in 
the amalgamation in 1989 of  around 850 organisations into 
86 local bodies plus a handful of  subsidiary bodies, such as 
the Auckland Regional Transport Authority.
There was also a greater emphasis on citizen service users 
as ‘kings and queens’ rather than ‘pawns’, and concern about 
monopoly providers acting as ‘knaves’ rather than ‘knights’. 
There was a changed role and reduced ownership by the 
state of  commercial activities.
Phase three: 1999–2008 – mixed governance by networks, 
hierarchies and communities
Recent developments are always more difficult to characterise 
as they are still evolving. Although some authors, such 
as Chapman and Duncan (2007), explore the suggested 
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emergence of  a ‘new’ New 
Zealand model, overall the 
evidence basis for this is 
weak (see also Boston and 
Eichbaum, 2007). While it is 
clear what the government 
is moving away from, it is 
less clear what institutional 
design principles are being 
used. This article explores 
this matter with regard to the 
structure of  the state.
One significant change 
was in local government, 
with the move from 
specific narrowly-defined 
function to in effect giving 
local authorities a general 
power of  competence. 
Local authorities are now 
charged under the new 
Local Government Act 2002 with pursuing four broad 
‘well-beings’ or outcomes – social, cultural, economic, and 
environmental in the context of  sustainable development. 
No significant central government functions or funding have 
been devolved, however. Local government in June 2007 
employed 12% of  the total public sector workforce and 
historical SNA data suggest that local government expends 
between 10 and 15% of  final government consumption. 
Note that one potential effect of  the reforms would be to 
increase vertical fragmentation by introducing an additional 
layer of  government into areas where traditionally only 
central government interacted directly with civil society. 
In terms of  central government, there was a distinct change 
in the rhetoric following the 1999 general election. Whether 
that rhetoric is reflected in reality on the ground, however, 
is arguable. There were modest moves towards devolution 
and decentralisation, such as the local government reforms 
discussed above and the health reforms, with the increased 
potential for local voice through local representatives on 
district health boards. In other areas, however, the trend has 
been opposite. In education, for example, local autonomy 
of  schools has been reduced with the removal of  direct 
resourcing. In workers’ compensation (ACC) the limited scope 
for provider choice for the earner’s account was removed. 
One clear trend is for a reduced role for competition in quasi-
markets in a number of  sectors, such as health. 
So what appears to underpin the patterns of  the structure 
of  the state? Is there an intelligent design evident behind the 
changes since 1999, or is the structure now morphing by 
accident as it did for most of  the 20th century? 
To address this question this article presents an analysis 
of  the changes in the structure of  central government since 
1999. It does not include changes, often triggered by a 
new chief  executive, in the way an agency organises itself  
internally. Instead, it focuses on external Cabinet-mandated 
changes in the structure of  
central government. All the 
external central government 
machinery-of-government 
changes between April 
1999 and July 2007 are 
classified into changes in 
legal form, merger and de-
merger, and new function/
function disestablished. 
(More detail on the analysis 
and supporting data are 
available in a separate paper 
from the author.)
The data in Table 1 are 
consistent with ‘muddling 
through’ in that there is 
no apparent pattern to the 
changes in the machinery 
of  central government. Key 
conclusions include:
• Fragmentation: a small (5%) net reduction in the number 
of  organisations – largely accounted for by consolidation in 
the tertiary education sector as four colleges of  education 
and a number of  small polytechnics were merged.
• Departments: the number of  departments has witnessed 
a small decline (to 40) but remains in line with the long-
term level over the 20th century.
• SOEs: traffic in both directions, with commercial objectives 
replaced by less commercial objectives (e.g. TVNZ and 
ACC/At Work) but other commercial activities moved 
to SOE status from Crown entity company status (e.g. 
Animal Control Products, Learning Media, Valuation 
New Zealand).
• The Crown entity sector faced the greatest change (50% 
turnover since 1999), with many mergers and changes in 
legal form.
• No preference for a particular legal form: for instance, since 
1999 three functions have been moved into departments 
from Crown entities (the Special Education Service into 
the Ministry of  Education, the Building Industry Advisory 
Council into the Department of  Building and Housing, 
and the Casino Control Authority into the Department 
of  Internal Affairs) and four moved out of departments 
(the Public Trust, the Energy Efficiency and Conservation 
Authority, the Tertiary Education Commission and the 
Office of  the Auditor and Controller-General).
• Existing public sector organisations taking on or shedding 
function explains little of  the change (8%).
• Active use of  change in legal form as well as mergers and 
break-ups (both 18%).
The key trend was not reform leading to the reduction 
in fragmentation, but rather the extent of  change, with 44% 
of  state sector bodies subject to Cabinet-approved external 
restructurings.ix In addition, more than half  of  departmental 
chief  executives restructured their organisations within 
Table 1: Consolidated machinery-of-government changes, 
1999-2007: summary of results (excluding name changes)
Numbers of Agencies 
(2007)
Department 
(40)
CE and 4th 
Schedule (137 
excluding 
schools, 
subsidiaries)
SOEs 
(18)
Total 
(excluding 
name 
changes)
Change in form 2 31 3 36
Function change 0 12 2 15
Merge/break up 6 26 4 36
Total turnover 8 69 9 86
Change in form % 5% 22% 17% 18%
Function change % 0 9% 11% 8%
Merge/break-up % 15% 19% 22% 18%
Total turnover % 20% 50% 50% 44%
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the first year of  their appointment. Such is the scale of  
restructuring that a recent survey commissioned by the State 
Services Commission (SSC) showed that in 2007, 55% of  
state servants reported that ‘their organisation had been 
involved in a merger or restructuring over the last two years’. 
The interesting thing about this result is that for the identical 
survey question in the United States, the corresponding 
number was 18%.
One area where there has clearly been no significant 
reduction in fragmentation is in the structure of  Cabinet. This 
is important as in New Zealand, unlike other comparable 
jurisdictions, there is no direct rule linking ministers and 
their portfolios to departments. Thus, there are a number 
of  configurations possible. The most common is one 
department and many ministers, but we also observe one 
minister to one department and occasionally one minister to 
many departments. 
In February 2008 there were 19 Labour Cabinet ministers, 
one non-Labour Cabinet minister, two non-Labour ministers 
outside the Cabinet and six Labour ministers outside the 
Cabinet. But most notable is the number of  discrete areas 
of  ministerial responsibility. This currently totals 109, with 
58 ministerial portfolios, 14 other responsibilities and 37 
associate ministers. Moreover, these portfolios are often 
fragmented across multiple players. In the justice sector, for 
example, there are seven departments, six Crown entities and 
seven ministerial portfolios (including other responsibilities). 
The latest Cabinet reshuffle (in November 2007) did, 
however, cluster all the portfolios that relate to innovation 
under one minister, which has improved the priority setting 
and alignment for the relevant entities. 
These multiple ministerial roles and portfolios are 
important because they significantly complicate the problem 
of  coordination and priority setting. The bigger the numbers, 
the greater the problem. Network theory shows how adding 
one more node increases the number of  connections 
exponentially. There is an old adage of  public administration 
that ‘the government gets exactly the amount of  co-ordination 
it wants’. In the case of  New Zealand, fragmentation begins 
at the top. 
What is the evidence about the impact of structure  
on performance?
One of  the striking features of  the academic literature is how 
little is actually known about institutional design and how 
little agreement there is on the link to performance. As Boston 
et al. (1996, p.70) observe, ‘There is no scholarly consensus 
on these questions with opposing doctrines offering opposite 
prescriptions.’ These doctrines or ‘administrative arguments’ 
can be expressed with considerable over-simplification as 
a contrast between proponents of  ‘small is beautiful’, who 
emphasise the gains from ‘focus’ and specialisation, and 
advocates for ‘big is better’, who express concern about 
the effect of  ‘fragmentation’. Concerns expressed about 
fragmentation at the organisational level include:
• loss of  economy as larger scale provides lower unit costs;
• loss of  efficiency as larger-scale units are better able to 
coordinate activities and prioritise across activities; and
• loss of  effectiveness as larger units are more resilient, have 
a deeper capability and are able to invest in learning.
Proponents of  ‘small is beautiful’ counter with concerns 
about the lack of  focus of  monolithic conglomerates, resulting 
in:
• loss of  economy as larger span of  control 
leads to higher cost above a tipping point;
• loss of  efficiency as larger units with multiple 
and sometimes conflicting roles are difficult 
to oversee, leading to organisational slack; 
and
• loss of  effectiveness as smaller units have 
greater adaptability because parts can 
innovate and learn from each other.
These contrasting views were framed in 
terms of  organisational performance. How does the overall 
performance of  the system as a whole stack up? The World 
Bank has developed World Governance Indicators (only 
available since 1996) to compare country performance in 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, corruption 
control, rule of  law, political stability, accountability and 
voice. These measures consistently place New Zealand in 
the top group of  up to seven countries on all governance 
measures. This is reinforced by the ‘Kiwis Count’ survey 
data (SSC, 2008) released in April 2008, which show that 
New Zealanders’ experience of  public services is comparable 
to that of  Canada, a well-regarded jurisdiction which also 
featured in the top tier on most but not all of  the World 
Bank Governance Indicators. This is consistent with the 
conclusion of  public sector management reviews which 
suggests that, while as always there is room for improvement, 
New Zealand has been relatively well served by its system of  
public management and the staff  who work within it. 
More importantly, the other states consistently in the top 
group on the World Bank Governance Indicators – Denmark, 
Iceland and Sweden – are all relatively ‘fragmented’, with 
a clear structural separation between policy ministries and 
delivery agencies. Correlation does not imply causation, 
but casual empiricism does not support the notion that 
fragmented systems necessarily are the low performers.
The analysis of  the structure of  the state over the last 
decade presented in this article showed that the key trend 
was not reforms leading to the reduction in fragmentation, 
but rather continued change and restructurings. This raises 
...there is little evidence of any improved 
performance from the restructuring, despite  
a significant increase in spending over the 
period. 
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questions about the available evidence about the impact of  
restructurings on performance. 
Internationally there is limited empirical evidence on 
whether public reorganisations improve performance. As one 
author has observed, ‘while few rigorous evaluations have 
been undertaken, the large number of  informal studies have 
been consistently negative’ (Downs and Lackey, 1986, p.185). 
Similarly, the private sector experience is that costs of  change 
are higher, benefits are smaller and they take longer to be 
realised. ‘Restructuring is a powerful but high risk tool for 
organisational change. In the short term, 
it almost invariably produces confusion, 
resistance and even a decline in effectiveness’ 
(Bolman and Deal, 2003, p.92).
Little New Zealand evidence is 
available, with the notable exception of  
commercialisation. One key trend since 
1984 has been the move of  commercial 
functions into commercial structures. 
Available reviews of  New Zealand 
experience with commercialisation are 
generally positive.
One of  the few New Zealand examples where an 
evaluation was explicitly commissioned as part of  a 
restructuring was reforms of  the health sector embodied in 
the Health Services Act 2001. It showed ‘no dramatic impact 
… on performance’ (Mays et al., 2007). The overall summary 
concludes that while the reforms have been very successful 
in achieving better sector buy-in, there is little evidence of  
any improved performance from the restructuring, despite 
a significant increase in spending over the period. There are 
at least two possible interpretations of  this result: either it is 
too early to tell, or business as usual. The evaluation finds 
some support for the too-early-to-tell view: ‘a large part of  
the period covered by the evaluation can justifiably be seen as 
the establishment phase of  the new system’ (ibid.); but much 
of  the argument is also consistent with ‘business as usual’ and 
‘continuity with the previous period’. In the latter view, the 
changes to the formal governance structure did not impact 
upon the real determinants of  system performance.
This raises an apparent paradox: there is limited agreement 
or evidence on the impact of  restructuring on performance 
(excepting comprehensive commercialisation programmes), 
and what exists is generally neutral or negative. But at 
the same time SSC data suggest that nearly 50% of  state 
servants in New Zealand have been through a restructuring 
in the last two years. What explains this apparent paradox? 
This paradox raises the possibility that change is based on 
hubris in the sense of  pretence of  knowledge that doesn’t 
exist, or inadequate understanding of  the complexity of  
organisational dynamics. One possible explanation is that the 
objective with restructuring is not to improve performance 
directly. Instead, it may be better understood as symbolic 
rhetoric used to justify change.
Organisational change can be used to signal the ‘illusion 
of  progress’. The famous apocryphal quotation often 
attributed to Petronius in 210 BC (Downs and Larkey, 1986, 
p.184) makes the point well:
 We trained hard … But it seemed that every time 
we were beginning to form up into teams we would 
be reorganised. I was to learn later in life we tend 
to meet any new situation by re-organising: and a 
wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion 
of  progress while producing confusion, inefficiency 
and demoralisation.
Conclusion – what do the likely future trends imply  
for the structure of the state?
The government of  the future will face increased competition 
and interdependence, and developments are increasingly 
complex, multi-sourced and multifaceted (OECD, 2001). 
Looking ahead, the next generation of  issues could 
include:
• internationalisation – we can’t do it on our own; both 
competing and working with other nations (e.g. regulation 
of  therapeutics);
• responsiveness to ageing and more diverse populations 
(e.g. Pasifika and Asian people in Auckland);
• technology enabling changes (e.g. personalisation of  
services);
• increased expectations of  generations Y & Z for 
individualised services;
• effectiveness (making a difference) not efficiency (doing 
more with less); and
• the ‘wicked’ problems and opportunities – gangs, family 
violence, drug abuse – being hard, unstructured, chaotic 
problems.
These are big challenges even for a state with highly 
effective government like that in New Zealand. In general, 
the challenges are not amenable to central bureaucratic 
Newtonian machine-age solutions. These are soft systems 
problems which require leadership and changes in styles 
of  working rather than changes to hard systems like 
structures. 
Responding to these challenges will require sophisticated 
responses, such as establishing networks to address cross-
cutting issues. This will place a premium on established 
relationships and increase the costs of  the ceaseless 
restructurings that undermine those relationships. The main 
learning for New Zealand is that we will need to be cautious 
These are big challenges even for a state  
with highly effective government like that in  
New Zealand. In general, the challenges are  
not amenable to central bureaucratic  
Newtonian machine-age solutions.
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about the use of  the restructuring lever, an idea of  the early 
20th century, if  we want to get on and address the problems 
of  the 21st century.
i This is a shortened and edited version of a paper presented at the ‘After the Reforms’ 
symposium in Wellington, 28-29 February 2008, hosted by the School of Government at 
Victoria University.
ii The original text had ‘two and a half million’ not a ‘few million’.
iii Forty departments, 197 other central government bodies (excluding schools and 
subsidiaries) and 86 local bodies. It is not entirely clear how Polascheck estimated 1,000 
government organisations in 1958 (and hence whether subsidiaries and schools were 
included).
iv An alternative measure of fragmentation is the degree of concentration, but there is no 
readily accessible data to measure trends in central or local government concentration.
v Polascheck (1958) provided an account of the evolution of the state from 1833, with early 
Pakeha settlement, through one omnibus department – the Colonial Secretary’s Office – 
in the 1840s through to the structure of the 1960s. The report of the Royal Commission 
on the State Services (the McCarthy commission), 1962, and Boston et al. (1996) 
provide a summary of more recent developments.
vi The corresponding number in 2007 is around 20%.
vii The author estimates that 50% of current Crown entities’ and departments’ formation 
post-dates 1984: e.g. 50% of Crown entities in existence in 2007 were incorporated 
before 1984 and around 50% of current departments also existed at that time (albeit with 
functions gained or lost). 
viii See Scott (2001, p.21) and Boston et al. (1996, p.86) for a discussion.
ix Comparable data from Norway (Lagried et al., 2008) shows a similar level of 
restructurings, with 55% of public bodies in Norway being restructured between 1995 and 
2007 compared to 44% in New Zealand over the period 1999–2007. Unlike New Zealand, 
in Norway these changes were dominated by break-ups and mergers. 
